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Abstract
National responses to a pandemic require populations to comply through personal 
behaviors that occur in a cultural context. Here we show that aggregated cultural 
values of nations, derived from World Values Survey data, have been at least as 
important as top-down government actions in predicting the impact of COVID-
19. At the population level, the cultural factor of cosmopolitanism, together with 
obesity, predict higher numbers of deaths in the first two months of COVID-19 on 
the scale of nations. At the state level, the complementary variables of government 
efficiency and public trust in institutions predict lower death numbers. The differ-
ence in effect between individual beliefs and behaviors, versus state-level actions, 
suggests that open cosmopolitan societies may face greater challenges in limiting 
a future pandemic or other event requiring a coordinated national response among 
the population. More generally, mass cultural values should be considered in crisis 
preparations.
Keywords Computational social science · Development · Cultural evolution · Health 
policy
Introduction
Combating the COVID-19 pandemic in nations around the world has depended on 
accurate information (e.g., Prather et al. 2020) guiding responses at different levels, 
including government response (Aksoy et  al. 2020; Bedford et  al. 2020; Chowell 
and Mizumoto 2020; Frey et al. 2020; Hale et al. 2020; Munster et al. 2020; Zhang 
and Qian 2020) as well as individual behaviors (Funk et  al. 2010; Guiteras et  al. 
2015; Maharaj and Kleczkowski 2012; Zhang and Centola 2019). Since culture is 
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the context for behavior (Gelfand et al. 2020; Muthukrishna 2020; Zhang and Cen-
tola 2019)—social scientists maintain that culture fundamentally determines behav-
ior, values, beliefs, and even perceived reality in a society (Cronk 1999; Durkheim 
1915; Henrich 2015)—effectiveness of intervention on COVID-19 by national gov-
ernments ought to reflect cultural values among the people of those countries. As 
cultural values vary substantially across the world (Aksoy et al. 2020; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005; Ruck et al. 2020a), there is a motivation to ascertain whether cultural 
values predict national COVID-19 rates.
Recent studies have used socioeconomic and public health variables to explain 
COVID-19 variation within the United States (Desmet and Wacziarg 2020) and also 
globally (de Oliveira et al. 2020). In the context of the literature on the effect of soci-
oeconomic factors on COVID-19 (Aksoy et al. 2020; Bedford et al. 2020; Chowell 
and Mizumoto 2020; Frey et al. 2020; Funk et al. 2010; Guiteras et al. 2015; Hale 
et al. 2020; Maharaj and Kleczkowski 2012; Munster et al. 2020; Zhang and Cen-
tola 2019; Zhang and Qian 2020), we use unique measures of national-scale cul-
tural values, derived from multivariate study of decades of World Values Survey 
results (Ruck et  al. 2018, 2020a, b). We examine these cultural effects in concert 
with known risks such as obesity and advanced age, together with variables describ-
ing government efficiency and public trust in institutions.
Here, we estimate the observable effects of these factors in different countries 
on national COVID-19 fatality rates. We assume deaths to be a delayed proxy for 
true number of cases (Baud et al. 2020; Birrell et al. 2020; Marchant et al. 2020), 
as fatality data are generally more reliable than case data. We use the COVID-19 
fatality data from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (Rosler 
et al. 2020). Although reported death counts have some uncertainty in terms of dif-
ferent government reporting structures (Economist 2020), alternatives such as data 
on excess deaths have not only reporting uncertainties but are also incomplete and 
scattered on the global scale (e.g., the Human Mortality database is limited to 33, 
mostly Western, countries with missing data).
The national-scale cultural factors are derived from recent work, applying a 
two-stage factor analysis to World and European Values Survey data (WVS 2020, 
EVS 2011) in 109 countries (Ruck et al. 2020a, b). The cultural factors we consider 
here are secular-rationality (RAT), cosmopolitanism (COS) and institutional trust 
(INST). We expect institutional trust (INST) within a population, which is likely 
to help government efforts to mitigate a pandemic (Aksoy et al. 2020), may exhibit 
effects in concert with the government efficiency variable. Secular-rationality (RAT) 
is correlated with secularism, political engagement (and critique), and respect for 
individual rights, but also low prosociality (Ruck et al. 2020a). We hypothesize that 
RAT would predict higher epidemic spread (and hence more deaths) among peo-
ple who are more individualistic and perhaps more heterogeneous in how they fol-
low guidelines. We also predict that the cultural factor of Cosmopolitanism (COS) 
would, all else being equal, predict more coronavirus deaths via the effect of per-
sonal intermixing. Populations with high Cosmopolitanism (COS) are more open to 
have neighbors that are foreign or of a different ethnicity (Ruck et al. 2018, 2020a).
We entered these cultural factors into a matrix of country-scale covariates, X, 
among the 88 counties for which we also have data for government efficiency from 
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an established index (WEF 2018; Mohamadi et al. 2017), as well as the logarithm of 
GDP per capita, population size, per cent urban population, obesity and per cent of 
population aged 65 and over (see Materials and Methods). We account for the demo-
graphic factors of population size and fraction aged over 65 by including these as 
covariates in the matrix. We also include national rates of obesity, which increases 
risk of fatality (Hamer et al. 2020) and fraction urban population, as clustering facil-
itates spread of COVID-19 (Yusef et  al. 2020). We also include Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), the effects of which will probably be commingled with obesity and 
longevity, which correlate with economic development.
We first explore the variance structure in the covariate matrix, X, by principal 
component analysis. We look at the component loadings and see how the first two 
principal components correlate with per-capita COVID-19 deaths. Subsequently, 
we use multivariate regression to explain how the individual covariates predict the 
residual variance in COVID deaths in the different countries N⃗
d
:
where the errors ϵ follow a negative binomial distribution and have a variance for 
a given mean, µ, of µ(1 + µ/r), where r is a dispersion parameter. The numbers of 
COVID deaths, N⃗
d
 , are daily-updated national counts (Rosler et al. 2020) through 
the first two months of the outbreak in each country.
Since COVID-19 deaths are count data that are highly dispersed, we model neg-
ative-binomial distributed errors, using the “glmmADMB” package in R (Bolker 
et al. 2012), rather than a more restrictive Poisson distribution. The regression deter-
mines the vector of country-specific coefficients, 𝛽  , applied to the covariate matrix 
X (Eq. 1). While we consider the covariates as constants for the duration of the pan-
demic, the number of COVID-19 deaths grew exponentially so we fit regressions 
at one-day intervals from 5 to 55 days after the day when the first death occurred 
in each country. To ensure the results of these regressions are not sensitive to the 
87-country sample, we find broadly the same results using an ensemble of boot-
strapped samples (see Supplementary Materials).
Results and discussion
We start by visualizing simple correlations that will subsequently be unpacked 
through mutivariate analysis. As Fig. 1 shows, the initial spread of COVID-19 was 
positively correlated with cosmopolitanism, COS (Adjusted r2 = 0.229, p < 0.0001) 
and rational-secularism, RAT (Adj. r2 = 0.217, p < 0.0001). Deaths correlate nega-
tively with institutional confidence, INST (Adj. r2 = 0.029, p = 0.066). There is little 
correlation, however, with government efficiency, but it is positive (Adj. r2 = 0.011, 
p = 0.168).
The first two principal components (PCs) from the principal component analy-
sis, which together explain 67% of the variance (Table 1), appear to capture two 
main sources of variation: people and institutions. The first component, PC1, 
which accounts for 46% of the variance, is positively loaded on all covariates 
(1)log(N⃗d) = 𝛽X + 𝜖,
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except INST, and not strongly loaded on government efficiency (Table  1, Figs. 
S1 and S2). The second component, PC2, which reflects 21% of the variance, is 
primarily loaded on institutional confidence (INST) and government efficiency 
(Gov. eff.). To ensure that our choice of government variable did not determine 
Fig. 1  COVID-19 spread versus cultural factors. Main plots show individual countries and LOESS cor-
relation. Insets show 1 S.D. confidence ellipses by cultural region (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Ruck et al. 
2020b): AI African-Islamic, Ba Baltic, CE Catholic Europe, Co Confucian, ES English Speaking, LA 
Latin America, PE Protestant Europe, Or Orthodox, SA South Asia
Table 1  Variable loadings of the 
first four principal components 
(PC), with their % variance 
explained (in parentheses)
GDP is logarithm of GDP per capita; Age 65+ is fraction of popula-
tion aged 65 and older. Details of all variables are in Materials and 
Methods
PC1 (46.1%) PC2 (21.1%) PC3 (13.0%) PC4 (7.4%)
RAT 0.746 − 0.156 0.538 0.098
COS 0.701 0.115 0.048 − 0.693
INST − 0.046 0.902 0.108 0.077
Gov. eff 0.467 0.751 0.043 0.152
Urban 0.781 0.067 − 0.480 − 0.014
GDP 0.898 0.176 − 0.142 0.141
Age 65+ 0.728 − 0.319 0.514 0.133
Obesity 0.691 − 0.363 − 0.465 0.192
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the outcome, we tested the effects on the PCA using additional, similar variables 
(see Supplement).
Venturing to interpret the PCA, it appears that PC1 is a “people” component—
cultural values, age and obesity—whereas PC2 captures the effectiveness of 
institutions, requiring effective governments and people with confidence in their 
institutions. The left side of Fig. 2 shows that COVID-19 deaths per capita cor-
relate positively with PC1 (Adj. r2 = 0.469, p < 0.0001) and negatively with PC2 
(Adj. r2 = 0.037, p = 0.045). A negative, but weaker, correlation with PC2 (Fig. 2, 
right) indicates that effective institutions predict reduced COVID-19 deaths per 
capita. As PC1 is also loaded on urbanism and GDP (Table 1), which themselves 
are underpinned by secular-rational and cosmopolitan cultural values (Ruck et al. 
2018, 2020a), the comingling of factors motivate our regression analysis.
Next, we explore these hypotheses raised by the PCA with multivariate regres-
sion, which helps disentangle the joint effects of cultural factors, government effi-
ciency, socioeconomic development and individual-level risks of age and obesity. 
In the regression results shown in Table  2, we have combined the institutional 
confidence and government efficiency variables as an interaction term, labelled as 
INST.Gov, as these combined variables are the essence of PC2, and also because 
we would expect governments to be more effective with public trust in their insti-
tutions. While Table  2 shows that INST.Gov has significant effect, the Supple-
mentary materials show that institutional confidence and government efficiency 
have limited effect independently (Table S1), even with the independent effects 
included (Table S2).
The regression (Table  2) shows increased effect of several covariates on 
COVID-19 deaths per capita between Day 10 and Day 50, likely because so many 
fatalities occur weeks after infection. The z-scores of these effects between 5 
and 55 days after the outbreak (Figure S3) increased over the first two months of 
the outbreak. By Day 50, the significant factors are more clear in the regression 
(Table 2). Not surprisingly, obesity and population size predict more deaths per 





















































Fig. 2  COVID-19 deaths vs (left) PC 1 and vs. (right) PC 2
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The combined variable, INST.Gov, predicts fewer deaths per capita (Table  2), 
which is broadly consistent with the negative correlation between PC2 and deaths 
(Fig. 2, right).
The regression results reveal similar patterns as the PCA. At the level of national 
populations, the cultural factor of cosmopolitanism, together with obesity, predict 
higher numbers of per-capita deaths in the first two months of COVID-19. At the 
government level, the complementary variables of government efficiency and public 
trust in institutions predict lower death numbers, but with weaker effect.
The measurable effect of the COS factor is larger after 50 days than after 10 days 
(Table 2), potentially because deaths increased by order(s) of magnitude during that 
time in many countries. We focus on Day 50 in Table 2, when the factor COS exhib-
its a larger effect than RAT (secular-rationalism). Strictly speaking, COS is a pre-
dictive factor in COVID deaths, not necessarily the ultimate cause. COS probably 
captures a cultural openness to human interaction, which facilitates COVID spread. 
Given the importance of government action (Hale et al. 2020)—in imposing travel 
restrictions, lockdowns and/or suspensions of educational, commercial and religious 
activities (Flaxman et al. 2020; Hsiang et al. 2020)—a reasonable counter-argument 
is that COS merely predicts the ability of national governments to control the pan-
demic. The problem with this is that authoritarian governments are better at impos-
ing restrictions, and authoritarianism tends to correlate negatively with COS (Ruck 
et al. 2020a). Another counter-argument might be that nations with lower COS are 
less prone to accurately/honestly report their COVID statistics, and hence higher 
COS predicts higher reported COVID-19 deaths. This is possible and should be the 
subject of more granular, qualitative research.
Table 2  Results of negative 
binomial regression
Predictors of COVID-19 deaths, 10 and 50  days after outbreak. In 
parentheses are heteroskedastic standard errors (for negative-bino-
mial-distributed errors)
Heteroskedastic adjusted significance: ***p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, 
†p < 0.10
Covariate (in matrix X) Day 10 Day 50
(Intercept) − 9.73 (2.45)*** − 18.38 (3.02)***
RAT − 0.37 (0.30) 0.46 (0.37)
COS 0.08 (0.22) 1.01 (0.26)***
Urban 0.00 (0.01) − 0.02 (0.01)
log(GDP) 1.17 (0.61)† 1.06 (0.78)
log (pop) 0.92 (0.18)*** 2.44 (0.20)***
INST.Gov − 0.04 (0.02)* − 0.04 (0.02)†
SARS − 0.05 (0.28) 0.19 (0.34)
Obesity 0.01 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)***
Age 65+ 0.05 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04)
Dispersion: parameter 1.56 1.02
AIC 660 1222
Observations 88 88
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Among demographic controls, population size and obesity predicted more 
deaths. By Day 50, obesity had the largest effect on COVID-19 deaths (Table 2). 
This was expected, as obesity increases the risk of fatality from COVID-19 (Hamer 
et al. 2020). Early in the outbreak (Day 10), higher GDP per capita predicts higher 
COVID-19 death rates (Table 2). While GDP correlates with obesity and life expec-
tancy, this additional effect of GDP on COVID-19 may reflect economic incentives 
of wealthier populations to resist shutdown measures.
More broadly, our results support the case that open and tolerant societies, which 
tend to be democratic (Ruck et al. 2020a), may make it harder for governments to 
effectively mitigate the effects of a pandemic such as COVID-19. It might be related 
to the degree to which “survival” is a prominent factor in cultural values, in the 
sense that survival values prioritize economic and physical security over self-
expression and quality of life, which tends to be more common in autocratic coun-
tries (Inglehart and Baker 2000). There is also a secondary effect of institutional 
confidence predicting lower deaths. All in all, this suggests that countries with high 
cosmopolitanism and low institutional confidence are in particular danger, such as 
many Latin American countries (Ruck et al. 2020a).
Finally, a larger question is the resilience of cultures and democracies to unprec-
edented challenges and events (Muthukrishna 2020). While trust in institutions pre-
dicted fewer COVID-19 deaths and ought to facilitate government action, this value 
has been declining for decades in many Western countries (Ruck et al. 2018). Cul-
tural values of cosmopolitanism, which predict the economic prosperity and democ-
racy of nations in the long term (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Ruck et al. 2018, 2020a, 
b) may, in short-term crisis events, hinder a strategic, coordinated national response. 
Hence, while a multi-decade trend towards greater openness towards minorities 
around the world (Ruck et al. 2020a) is normally a good thing, governments should 
consider the role of cultural values in preparing for the next pandemic.
Materials and methods
Data on COVID‑19 fatalities
COVID-19 deaths: data from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (Rosler et al. 2020) were obtained from ourworldindata.com. Government 
efficiency index is taken from the World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Competi-
tiveness (WEF 2018); it is a composite measure that quantifies: (1) efficient public 
spending, (2) weak burdens on private companies, (3) efficient judiciary, (4) respon-
sive to private sector and (5) transparent policy changes. GDP per capita is meas-
ured at purchasing power parity (constant 2011 international dollars) for most recent 
year available for each country (World Bank 2018). Government response index is 
a composite variable of comprising information on 17 policies thought to help miti-
gate COVID-19 spread (Hale et al. 2020), including containment (school closures, 
mobility restrictions etc.), economic policies (e.g., direct payments) and heath poli-
cies (e.g., testing regimes, extra healthcare spending).
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Methods for counting COVID-19 deaths vary between countries (e.g. includ-
ing deaths at home as well as hospitals, likelihood of less effective counting in 
low income countries) as there is no internationally accepted standard. Cultural 
and political variables, which are inherent to our regressions, may also affect how 
COVID-19 deaths are counted. We nevertheless believe the effect of reporting dif-
ferences to be small in our results. First, a plot of cumulative data from 25 Nov 
2020, from 167 countries (with at least 1,000 reported cases) follow a linear slope 
(i.e., case fatality ratio, CFR) of 2.0% (r2 = 0.89). Notably, cumulative figures from 
the four income categories for nations (low, lower middle, upper middle, high) fall 
on this same line. Hence, if deaths at lower income levels were significantly under-
reported, cases would have to be under-reported by the same percentage. The CFR 
across these categories ranges from 1.56% in low income countries to 3.09% in 
upper middle-income countries, suggesting some under-reporting of deaths in lower 
income countries. In log-transformed numbers, however, this is only a 15% differ-
ence, very slight on a log–log plot of cases versus deaths.
Furthermore, the outlier nations seem to reflect actual pandemic situation rather 
than reporting irregularities. The lowest CFRs are Singapore (0.048%), Curacao 
(0.16%), Qatar (0.17%), Botswana (0.31%), UAE (0.35%), and Maldives (0.36%), 
each of which appears to have been genuinely strict in controlling COVID-19, such 
as requiring visitors to show a negative result from a certified COVID-19 PCR-test. 
The highest CFRs are in Yemen (29%), Mexico (9.7%), Sudan (7.4%), Ecuador 
(7.1%) and Bolivia (6.2%), all of which are countries with genuinely, tragically high 
COVID-19 death rates as opposed to outstanding administrative protocols for report-
ing them. In summary, while there is uncertainty in the COVID-19 death numbers, 
we do not believe these uncertainties are systematic or large enough to explain our 
regression results.
Control variables
Control variables were collated by ourworldindata.com (Rosler et al. 2020). These 
variables included percentage aged over 65  years from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, population sizes of nations in 2010 are from the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Percentage urban population 
for nations in 2017 come from the World Bank’s development indicators (Ritchie 
and Roser 2018). Obesity is measured as the percentage of the population aged over 
18 that have a BMI greater than 30, using data from the World Health Organization 
(https ://ourwo rldin data.org/obesi ty). We measured exposure to SARS during the 
2002–2004 outbreak as a dummy variable, where a country is assigned a one if they 
had at least one case and a zero otherwise (WHO 2020). The countries effected by 
SARS are: China Hong Kong, Taiwan, Canada, Singapore, Vietnam’, United States, 
Philippines, Thailand, Germany, France, Australia, Malaysia, Sweden, Great Brit-
ain, Italy, India, South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa, Kuwait, Ireland, New Zea-
land, Romania, Russia, Spain and Switzerland.
Cultural factors, including secular-humanism (RAT), openness to minorities 
(COS) and trust in institutions (INST), were derived from multivariate statistics and 
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the World and European Values surveys (WEVS) data from 109 nations (EVS 2011; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Ruck et  al. 2018, 2020a, b; WVS 2020). The WEVS 
data are derived from the same 64 questions in the five waves of these surveys at 
5-year intervals since 1990, administered to 476,583 participants from 109 different 
nations. These data were compressed into multivariate factors in two steps. The first 
used Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to identify nine cultural factors underly-
ing the WEVS data. From the EFA step, we summarized the common variance in 
the WEVS data and thereby remove the portion of the total variance that is likely 
to be measurement error or other forms of statistical noise. We then used the EFA 
factor loadings as weights for Principal Component Analysis (PCA), as the orthogo-
nality of the principal components is advantageous for our subsequent regression 
modelling.
Here we have used the first three of these cultural components, labelled: Trust 
in Institutions, INST, Cosmopolitanism, COS, and Secular-Humanism, RAT (Ruck 
et al. 2020b). These components were interpreted based on the correlated cultural 
factors from the raw survey questions. Trust in Institutions, INST, was correlated 
with cultural factors such as confidence in institutions (r = 0.58) and interest in poli-
tics (r = 0.86). Individuals with high trust in institutions report high confidence in 
institutions like the media, the army and government and also have an active interest 
in politics. Secular-Humanism, RAT, is correlated with secularism (r = 0.76), polit-
ical engagement (r = 0.62), respect for individual rights (r = 0.59) and low proso-
ciality (r =  − 0.45) (Ruck et al. 2018). High RAT reflects survey respondents who 
reported, for example, that religion is not important in their lives, that they are likely 
to attend protests or sign petitions, they only pay taxes when coerced and believe 
that homosexuality and divorce are justifiable (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Ruck 
et al. 2018). Cosmopolitanism, COS, is correlated with the exploratory cultural fac-
tors for ‘openness to out-groups’ (r = 0.78), ‘openness to norm violators’ (r = 0.78) 
and ‘subjective well-being’ (r = 0.43). High COS implies willingness to have neigh-
bours that are immigrants, from another race, homosexual or from other stigmatized 
groups; as well as self-reporting happiness and life satisfaction (Ruck et  al. 2018, 
2020b).
Principal component analysis
For principal component analysis (PCA), we use the ‘Factominer’ and ‘Factoextra’ 
packages in R to compute the contributions (Table S1) and loadings (Table S2) of 
the principal components. The PCA included all variables for 83 nations excluding 
Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, North Ireland, and Taiwan, which lacked urbaniza-
tion data.
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